This depends on how you define the terms "evidence," "deity," and "supernatural." On panentheism, the Universe, or God, does not have to have all attributes commonly ascribed to deities but only enough to be reasonably regarded as deic in nature. It does not have to be "supernatural," for example.
Even if there is no empirical evidence that strictly proves or strongly suggests that the universe is divine, there may be good logical arguments for the proposition that it is divine, some of which I have provided.
Thus far your only real arguments were 1) a baseless assertion that consciousness cannot be naturally occurring, 2) an ill-defined assertion as to the nature of a god, and 3) pointing out that it works better than a debunked philosophy, and works with other equally-unprovable philosophies.
From what i understand it is just a philosophical/ontological point of view about the nature of matter. It doesn’t imply any kind of finality nor intelligent powerful entity. I don’t see any good reason to call it "god" or "theology" apart from fun. Is there any other reason ?
It's perfectly explainable, you just ignore the answer that's given. "Consciousness" can arise from unconscious matter in the same way that life can arise from inanimate matter. We may have never shown abiogenesis, but we certainly know it's made of the same constituent parts.
I don’t think (s)he is ignoring anything, there is a real complexity. Life and intelligence come from matter, there is no problem with that, they are physical systems with particular properties. "life" and "intelligence" are particular categorizations of physical systems.
But subjectives experiences don’t seem to be a particular categorizations of physical systems.
The objective descriptions don’t describe the subjective experiences.(which doesn’t mean that physical systems don’t create the subjectives experiences).
It requires emergentism, which must lead either to dualism, panpsychism, idealism, or be logically incoherent in the form of "X is not-X" because consciousness and matter are said to be identical but different.
Then how do you justify computers? We can make inanimate objects perform arbitrary decisions. Why is it any less likely that the brain operates on a similar level, especially given that its signals are mostly given by electricity?
We are not certain that anything has ever come from nothing. All we are certain of is that we don't know what kind of thing these "virtual particles" come from. But it is logically necessary that they came from something. You are mistaking an epistemic fact for an ontological one.
Quantum vacuum is definitely not nothing. Nothing come from nothing isn’t a ontological fact, it is a logical one.
We are misled by thinking of "nothing" as if it was a "something" (by example, empty space, individual point, etc…).
f(nothing) is a shortened to way to say "∀x not(f(x))".
- Thinking about nothing, mean to not think at all, and not to think about a particular thing. (thinking about nothing, not about the concept of nothing, which is something).
- There is nothing, mean not(there is something)
- "Something come nothing", mean "not(something come from something)", which mean, "nothing come from something" which mean "not(nothing come from nothing)" which is false.
This depends on your definition of greater. 3 > 2, but 2 is not a subset of 3. Likewise, the same is possible of a supreme being, because by many definitions of greatest, it need only be the best of a given set (where that set is everything).